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Why the Other Side Knows More Than You in a Property Negotiation
Negotiation

Why the Other Side Knows More Than You in a Property Negotiation

10 August 2026 · 6 min read · By Breige Quinn

In 1970 the economist George Akerlof published a paper called The Market for "Lemons". It won him a Nobel Prize, and it described a problem that fits Australian real estate almost perfectly.[1]

The problem is information asymmetry. One party in a transaction knows more than the other, and the better informed party can use that gap.

In property, the gap usually runs one way. The selling agent knows the property's flaws, the vendor's real motivation, how many other people have genuinely shown interest, and the lowest number the vendor will accept. You know what they choose to tell you.

Why the gap exists by design

It is not that selling agents are dishonest. It is that they are not working for you, and they are not pretending to.

A selling agent is legally obliged to act in the vendor's interests. Their job is to achieve the highest price the market will bear. Everything they tell you is filtered through that obligation, and it should be.

The mistake buyers make is treating the selling agent as a neutral source of market education. They are the opposite. They are the single most motivated party in the transaction.

When you do not know the full picture, you become vulnerable to a specific set of things:

  • Paying more than you needed to because of urgency that was manufactured, or competing offers you never saw evidence of
  • Buying a property with problems that were not disclosed and that you did not know to look for
  • Missing a property you could have had, because you did not know the vendor's timeline or what they actually cared about

The internet closed part of the gap, not all of it

Anyone can now look up past sale prices, days on market and suburb demographics in about thirty seconds. Basic data is genuinely symmetric in a way it was not twenty years ago.

What has not equalised is context.

You might know that a house down the street sold for $2.5 million last month. Do you know why? Do you know it went off-market because the vendors needed a thirty-day settlement? Do you know the house you are looking at has an aspect that local agents quietly treat as a discount?

Raw data without interpretation is not an advantage. It can be the opposite, because it feels like knowledge.

What actually closes the gap

You bring someone to the table who holds the same information the other side does.

Where you are exposedWhat representation changes
You can only see what is on the portalsAccess to the off-market conversations where a lot of premium stock trades quietly
You have fallen for the property and it showsSomeone unemotional sitting between you and the selling agent
You are guessing at value and at the vendor's motivationAgent-to-agent relationships that surface the actual story behind the listing

The dynamic shifts the moment a selling agent knows they are dealing with someone who transacts in that market every week. It becomes much harder to be vague about comparable sales or imply competition that is not there, because the person across the table can check.

Information is leverage, not just protection

The defensive case is easy to see. The offensive one matters more.

If you know the vendor has already bought elsewhere and is carrying bridging finance, a fast unconditional settlement is worth real money to them, and that is leverage on price. If you know a property sat quietly off-market for three months because it was priced too high, you know not to open at a premium on day one of the public campaign.

You do not need to understand economics to act on this. You only need to accept that in the largest transaction of your life, what you do not know is not neutral. Someone else already knows it, and they are using it.

Sources

  1. Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. jstor.org/stable/1879431
  2. Broxterman, D., & Zhou, T. (2022). Information Frictions in Real Estate Markets: Recent Evidence and Issues. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics. pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov